A lie about 1,000 tubes

One of the Nanox promoters now wants the CEO removed to an Executive Chairman role, for various reasons.

One of the reasons - the 1,000 magic x-ray tubes that vanished (the 10 fake Nanox.Arc "produced" in November 2020, and the 25 fake Nanox.Arc "produced" in March 2021 were already addressed on this blog).

So, yeah, on the March 2, 2021 results call, the CEO insisted:

So again, just to clarify, for 2021 shipment, which is 1000 units, we are all set. We have secured actually everything we need in terms of chips and tubes and actually metal parts for the system. So for the 1,000 systems that we intend to make and ship this year or latest first quarter of next year, we are set.

He said today that the tube "supplier" is having some problems finishing and testing those tubes.  Poof, 1,000 tubes vanished.  Actually, they were never real - as discussed on this blog, Nanox has no ability to obtain the chips that are supposed to go into these proposed tubes, because the Japanese university labs it claims to be renting prohibit commercial use.   Moreover, the tube assembly Korean "facility" that Nanox showed in a video during RSNA 2020 was labeled "R&D," with no apparent vacuum sealing capabilities - so no assembly there either.

Update May 12, 2021:  Of course, it was not a thousand tubes.  Each of the first 1,000 Nanox.Arc devices is now supposed to have 5 tubes, bringing the number of disappearing tubes to 5,000 (plus spares).

News in Nanox annual report

What's news and notable in Nanox annual report, relative to the Prospectus filed in February? 

Material weakness

We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting in connection with the audit of our financial statements as of and for the years ended December 31, 2019 and 2020. (page 49)

Oops.  That's even before any revenues are recognized.

Dangling chips 

 As mentioned above, we currently manufacture the MEMs X-ray chips in the clean rooms located in Tokyo, Japan (page 15)

Nothing like it is mentioned above (in the annual report).  The rest of the statement, of course, is also false - the clean rooms located in Tokyo, Japan do not allow commercial use, and therefore Nanox cannot manufacture the proposed "digital" x-ray source that relies on those chips (and, in reality, there is nothing digital or MEMs about them).

 

No working Nanox.Arc

Although we have produced a working prototype of the Nanox.ARC and developed a prototype of the Nanox.CLOUD, we have not produced any of the approximately 15,000 Nanox.ARC units planned for the initial global deployment under the contract manufacturing agreement with FoxSemicon Integrated Technology, Inc., a subsidiary of Foxconn (“FITI”).  (page 7)

So, one working prototype of Nanox.CART, the one that got cleared?   But no working prototypes of Nanox.Arc?  Is this an admission, finally, that the RSNA 2020 demo of the Nanox.Arc was faked?  Why couldn't Nanox complete even one of the 10 prototypes that Nanox was supposedly assembling in November 2020 (according to the Q3 2020 results call)?  What happened to those mock-ups in all these production photos pushed by Nanox and its promoters this year?

A side note here:  Nanox never signed an agreement with FITI, according to the text of the contract manufacturing agreement.  The agreement was signed with a Japanese company that is not a Nanox subsidiary, according to public corporate records.

No ceramic tubes

We are evaluating, subject to completion of testing, a transition from glass-based X-ray tubes to ceramics-based tubes for cost efficiency purposes, which are the tubes to be used in the multi-source version of the Nanox.ARC, and we intend to enter into an agreement for such ceramics-based tubes with a new manufacturer in the future. (page 14)

That is, Nanox still cannot manufacture the ceramic tubes that the CEO claimed were used at the RSNA 2020 demo of both the Nanox.Cart and Nanox.Arc.  So, the RSNA 2020 demo was fake and the FDA 510(k) submission may have been fraudulent.

Fuji is out

We have not entered into any licensing agreements; however, we expect to enter into negotiations regarding a commercial arrangement with FUJIFILM Corporation for the licensing of our Nanox System. Any of the above factors may negatively affect the implementation of our Licensing Model, or cause our Licensing Model to fail. (page 12)

This is an admission that Fuji is not a Nanox Mamography OEM (that is, all Nanox investor presentations so far have been misleading ).  In the Prospectus, Nanox still falsely claimed:  

We are currently discussing the terms of a potential commercial agreement with FUJIFILM Corporation.

Chinese tubes 

We have, and expect to enter into, agreements with manufacturers and/or suppliers in China for the production of our X-ray tube, the Nanox.ARC and some of their respective components. (page 23)

Is this an admission that Nanox is using a regular low-cost, low-quality, hot-cathode Chinese x-ray tube and calling it "digital?"

 

A confused FDA: Cart or Arc

 

... we submitted a 510(k) premarket notification for the Nanox Cart X-Ray System... in January 2020... On January 30, 2021, we received additional information requests from the FDA which, among other things, require us to address certain deficiencies and questions, including requests that we provide additional support regarding the intended use of the Nanox.ARC and the comparability of the Nanox.ARC to the predicate device. We submitted our response to these requests on March 1, 2021. On April 1, 2021, we received clearance from the FDA to market our Nanox Cart X-Ray System. ...we may seek alternatives for commercialization of our Nanox Cart X-Ray System.  (page 32) 

Why was the FDA asking about Nanox.Arc in January 2021?  The device that got submitted and eventually got clearance is Nanox Cart X-Ray System, that is, the ugly Nanox.Cart, not the fake Nanox.Arc. The FDA should have asked about Nanox Cart X-Ray System, no?

Nanox also confirms that it still has no plans the market/commercialize the Nanox Cart X-Ray System even after its pre-market notification got cleared.

Update:  Muddy Waters tweets about Gilad Yron, the Chief Business Officer, no longer counting as an executive, which I missed (it is not clear what his current role is, if any). 

Update April 8, 2021:  Fixed some spelling.  Also, the Nanox.Cloud prototype developed by Nanox is just a collection of a few mock-up screens that use stolen images and contain non-sensical findings.